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Abstract: Informed by cognitive narratology and specifically based on our
metarepresentational ability, this paper explores how the subjectivity in Henry
James’s tales is transferred to the summaries provided by critics for the orienta-
tion of readers. Since it enables real, and realistic, minds to process content
along with sources and paths of propagation, the metarepresentational skill
proves to be an essential instrument for discriminating in narrative texts the
authenticated, source-free facts from those which are contingent on the sub-
jective domains of characters and character-narrators. When for a number of
reasons this skill is relaxed or altogether deactivated in the act of summarizing,
the resulting product will betray the original work by projecting a distorted or
reductive image of it, particularly in a writer like James who was increasingly
concerned with imparting informational verisimilitude to his fiction. The treat-
ment of metarepresentational sources in the summaries of James’s tales gener-
ates perplexing patterns, such as when the handling of sources in a summary
contradicts the critic’s own conclusions elsewhere in his or her work. This clash
yields insights into the authenticating function of the fictional text in connection
with its cognitive rhetoric.
Keywords: cognitive narratology, metarepresentation, treatment of sources,
summarization, short story, Henry James
“You mean that you’ve been with Mrs. Meldrum?”
“Yes; to ask her what she knows and how she comes to know it …”
Henry James, “Glasses” (1896); italics added
This is a metacritical paper on the strategies used by scholars and commen-
tators of Henry James’s short fiction in order to summarize his stories for the
benefit of readers before submitting them to, or in the course of, critical
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perusal. Implicitly, it is also a reflection on the frame of mind and methodo-
logical outlook evinced by such strategies. Put in more specific terms, I
intend to describe a process and its consequences: first, how the subjectivity
of characters and character-narrators is dealt with – whether foregrounded,
nuanced, or altogether concealed – in transit from original tales to para-
phrases and abstracts; second, how these moves define the fictional factuality
of the baseline storyworld denoted by a summary in relation to both the
authentication potential of the primitive text and the subjective domains of
the inhabitants of that storyworld. The stereotypical depiction of James as a
paradigm case of the so-called “epistemological novelist” (Armstrong 1978: 5)
in view of his concerns with the acquisition and propagation of intelligence
in his works can be given a new edge by focusing on how summarizers treat
uncertainty and unreliability, as well as by noting their frequent attempts to
finalize and close off narratives that remain arguably open in the original
versions. I plan to achieve these aims in three stages. Sections 1 and 2
describe the conceptual bases of my approach. These bases are the metare-
presentational ability of readers and critics, often informed by the notion of
schema, and how failures in this ability of the former can impair the poten-
tial of critical summaries fully to reflect what goes on in a story much in the
same way as it degrades the reliability of narrators. Sections 3 and 4 form the
core of this paper. Here I pick up the idea of summary as it is employed by
Jamesian critics, examine two contrasting instances, and use them as points
of reference to discuss the variety of patterns that emerge from the treatment
of subjectivity in the summarizing process. Finally, Section 5 offers some
concluding remarks, and hints at the common ground occupied by metare-
presentation, possible-world semantics, and fictional authentication as a
potential field for further research into the cognitive-narratological aspects
of summarization.
1 Metarepresentation and schema
Although in different proportion and with different emphasis, the concepts of
metarepresentation and schema underpin the analysis of how the subjectivity
make-up of a Jamesian tale fares when summarized in the context of critical
scrutiny. Originally identified and studied in the field of cognitive psychology,
and later exploited by cognitive narratologists to describe the informational
structure of narrative works, our metarepresentational ability enables us to
acknowledge the existence of other minds and attribute to them mental states
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and propositional attitudes.1 Plainly expressed, if I think or say “The corridor
was dim,” I am representing a portion of reality, that is, I am incorporating a
state of affairs into my mental architecture, making it part of my subjectivity. But
if I think or say “The elderly tenant believed that the corridor was dim,” I am
making a statement about a mind engaged in representing the world – I am
metarepresenting. In other words, I am activating a cognitive adaptation which,
in this case, decouples thought from reference via the elderly tenant’s mind and
allows me to create a subjective image of the functioning of somebody else’s
interiority.
Looked at from another angle, however, the metarepresentational ability
which makes it possible for us to think about thinking also provides the means
to keep track of the sources of metarepresentation.2 In order to process the above
example correctly, it is insufficient to store in memory – and retrieve from it
when appropriate – the bare content that the corridor is dim; it is indispensable
to do so in conjunction with the source of that piece of intelligence, namely the
elderly tenant. This metarepresentational ability allows us to survive in a world
of contingent information whose truth value is not absolute but relative to a set
of circumstances, especially its provenance. To pair the dimness of the corridor
with the fact that it is a representation made by an elderly tenant (not a young
man or woman, not the owner of the property) may prompt us to mentally
process the content “under advisement” (Zunshine 2006: 50), guardedly, always
considering the extent to which failing eyesight or a grumbling disposition may
lie at the root of this representation, even if persistent source-monitoring can
prove to be cognitively fatiguing. But if the dimness of the corridor is confirmed
by direct experience, by the representations of a number of other individuals, or
by both, then we may eventually drop the source-tag pointing to the elderly
tenant and treat the content as an unconditional certainty, a so-called “archi-
tectural truth” (Cosmides and Tooby 2000: 60) which can be safely used as the
basis for further inference or action – for instance, calling in an electrician to
improve the lighting system. Metarepresentation involving several minds
1 The mechanism of cognitive metarepresentation has been extensively discussed from many
different angles in the specialized literature. A good starting point to grow familiar with this
mental skill is the collection of papers edited by Sperber (2000a). For particularly relevant
approaches outside this collection, see, among many others, Dennett (1989: 13–35), Leslie
(1987), Perner (1993: 59–65, 82–89), Recanati (2000), Scott (2001), Proust (2007), Egeth and
Kurzban (2009) and Bremer (2012).
2 The crucial paper in this respect is by Cosmides and Tooby (2000), but see also Sperber’s
comments (2000b: 135); their insights have been influentially applied to the field of narrative
theory by Zunshine (2006).
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(the example just discussed) or several levels of the same mind (“Suddenly I
realized I was bored with my job”) can be recursive on condition that the
terminal object of representation is not a mindless entity (e.g. my job, the
dimness of the corridor) but a mindful one, as instanced by typical strings
such as “Suddenly I realized my suspicion that Tom had guessed the truth
behind Alita’s enthusiasm for his poems,” which can be virtually unlimited
except by the human capacity to successfully process more than a few levels
of mind embedding. Needless to say, however, the larger this capacity, the better
prepared a cognitive subject is to navigate the social world.
Since the narrative is naturally the locus of indirection, it is just predictable
that the metarepresentational ability will fulfil a vital role in discriminating
between the many flows of information circulating in a text, as well as in tracing
them back to their respective sources so that they do not collapse into a single,
chaotic stream hindering comprehension and judgement. This is a direct con-
sequence of the functional analogy between real-life and realistic literary minds
that allows metarepresentational strategies to operate both across the fictional
border and beyond it, that is, among fictional characters themselves.3 In princi-
ple, there is no fundamental difference between how a mental disposition
of extreme cruelty is attributed to a notorious child murderer featured in
the news and, say, to Rose Armiger in James’s novel The other house (1896).
The same is basically true of how the other characters – especially Dr. Ramage
in his reconstruction of the murder – attach this disposition to Rose’s mindset.
Any reader of fictions endowed with a degree of “sociocognitive complexity”
(Zunshine 2011: 115) just beyond that of a Proppian folktale is torn between two
innate drives – to track methodically who says what, who thinks what, and how
circuitously intelligence propagates, thus spending a great deal of cognitive
energy in processing each piece of information along with its source and
circumstances, or else to lower the intensity of the protection afforded by the
metarepresentational mechanism, neglect source-tags, and run the risk of con-
struing subjective inferences and mental states as fully established fictional
facts. As will be argued below, critics’ summaries of James’s stories tend to
oscillate between these two opposed poles.
3 Both theorists of mind and cognitive narratologists endorse the functional similarity between
real and fictional minds of the realistic variety. Two claims are usually made in this regard –
first, that fictional minds are best understood when looked at in the light of research done on
real minds (Palmer 2004: 144, 2010: 7); second, that fictional minds are hypothesized and
reconstructed in the same way as real minds, and thus function analogously (Pollard-Gott 1993:
505; Pinker 1998: 541; Schneider 2001: 3; Palmer 2004: 163, 198–200; Zunshine 2006: 166n18;
Ryan 2010: 477; Palmer 2010: 11, 19, 56).
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In addition to the metarepresentational source-tracking skill and its capacity
to monitor the insertion of subjectivity in the narrative text, my discussion also
draws, albeit less systemically, on the concept of schema and its role in text
comprehension, memorizing, recalling, and summarization. The schema is a
psychological construct whose earliest formulation dates back to Frederic C.
Bartlett’s work on reconstructive memory in the 1930s (Bartlett 1932).4 It can be
understood as the unconscious structure of socio-cultural preconceptions,
expectations, and generic knowledge which resides in memory and conditions
top-down how texts are comprehended, recalled, and summarized. Schemata
are responsible for a person remembering and reporting features of a narrative
which are actually absent from it, but which are conventionally expected of a
given textual class – e.g. a literary genre. In this paper, the notion of schema will
be used to explain key aspects of the summarizing strategies applied by critics to
James’s tales, and specifically the misrepresentations that often arise from
missing their informational complexity.
2 Metarepresentation and unreliability
in narrators — and critics
In her book Why we read fiction (2006), Lisa Zunshine makes a substantial
contribution to the ongoing debate on narrative unreliability and argues that it
can be accounted for by the failure of the metarepresentational mechanism. In
her view, when the source-tag of a metarepresentation is inappropriately
dropped or, more concretely, when a narrator reports a metarepresentation of
which he or she is the source (“I thought the corridor was dim”) as if it were a
representation (“The corridor was dim”), then a state of mind may spuriously
acquire the status of a fictional fact, corrupt the authenticating function of the
narrative text, and inject an unknown measure of subjectivity, whether factual
or judgemental, into the reporting. Elliptical metarepresentations (Recanati
2000: 74) are indeed uncanny artefacts. They denote a state of affairs which,
in principle, goes unchallenged, since narrators enjoy a default bonus of cred-
ibility probably based on the reader’s tendency to economize on cognitive
resources by not making a point of processing each piece of intelligence along
with its course of propagation. But if narratorial reporting is ever felt to clash
with what Wayne C. Booth called “the norms of the work” (1983: 158) or, more
4 Other names proposed in the 1970s for closely related notions are, for instance, theme
(Dooling and Lachman 1971), script (Schank and Abelson 1975), and frame (Minsky 1975).
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simply, with common sense and plain verisimilitude, the whole system is
destabilized, the reader’s metarepresentational competence is alerted, and the
sourcelessness of many pieces of information questioned. We then begin to read
against the narrator and interpret much of what he says as silently emerging
from his or her own subjectivity, that is, as a set of unacknowledged metare-
presentations. Zunshine illustrates these phenomena in novels with first-person
narrators, whether epistolary or not, such as Clarissa (1748) and Lolita (1955).
This is quite in line with the standard view that narrative unreliability is more
readily associated with character-narrators than with heterodiegetic, impersonal
ones. But nothing prevents third-person narrators from being unreliable (see, for
instance, Murphy and Walsh 2017). For this to happen, they simply have to treat
a metarepresentation whose source is a focalizing character embedded in the
storyworld as if it were the source-free representation of an authenticated
fictional fact. In this case, what actually matters is not if the reporting agent
inhabits the same ontological realm as the characters whose deeds are
recounted, but rather where information originates and how explicitly sign-
posted is its path of circulation.
So when narrators lose track of themselves or of others as sources of the
metarepresentations they report – with the consequences just sketched – we call
them unreliable if they are not conscious of being deceptive, and outright liars if
they are. But what happens when it is readers and critics who choose to relax
their metarepresentational skills and ignore the occasionally very complex
informational structure of narrative texts by simply treating explicit source-
bound metarepresentations as if they were representations? It seems perfectly
arguable that readers or critics who fail to trace a particular content to its
ultimate source, and thus compromise its correct decoupling from other flows
of information, could also be branded unreliable by mere analogy, and their
(critical) statements kept in abeyance as authoritative representations of what
goes on in the storyworld.
Such treatment of sources tends to occur with James’s mature narratives,
well noted in general for being the site of meticulously crafted epistemic set-ups
intended to eschew omniscience, or, as he himself put it, the “mere muffled
majesty of irresponsible ‘authorship’” (James 1984: 321). Take, for instance, a
critical assertion made of “The author of Beltraffio” (1884), one of his writer-hero
fictions, to the effect that Mark Ambient’s sister, Gwendolen, “attempts in herself
to be a work of art” (Winner 1968: 103). Thus stated, her intentional stance takes
the weight and finality of a fictional truth – she seeks to be a work of art, period.
But this rather results from having underrated all the evidence strewn across the
tale that the first-person narrator’s aestheticizing frame of mind persistently
transmutes into art Mark Ambient’s dwelling place, his wife Beatrice, his child
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Dolcino, and, of course, his sister Gwendolen, who might or might not herself
aspire to be an object d’art. It is the young, impressionable narrator who
describes her as “pictorial” and “consumed with the love of Michael-
Angelesque attitudes,” and who interprets her gaze ad libitum as if it said to
him, “Do you perceive how artistic we are? Frankly now, is it possible to be more
artistic than this?” (James 1996–1999: 2.878, 2.878, 2.881). So it would have been
more accurate to have processed the content of Gwendolen’s alleged aspiration
along with its source either by making it propositionally explicit (“the narrator
believes that”), by using distancing expressions (“apparently,” “it seemed
that”), or by any other means intended to foreground the genuine metarepre-
sentational status of a purported fictional fact. An even more glaring instance of
the tampering with sources in this same tale is the statement that “Beatrice has
asserted that she would rather send her son early to heaven than expose him to
what she believes to be the pagan, even immoral, content of her husband’s
writing” (Kraver 2001: 35). No matter how closely one reads the tale, such a
callous assertion never passes her lips. It rather dawns on the narrator in the
later stages of the narrative that it is just possible that things occurred in this
way,5 his first-hand observations leading him to this ghastly conviction only
when goaded by Gwendolen’s confidences. So Beatrice’s stated determination is
not an unconditional, source-free given, but rather an interlocking network of
suppositions and more or less direct experiences, each with a traceable source
and path of propagation. All this complexity yet gives way when the critic takes
a short cut and raises a unilateral, personal reading to the status of a positive
fact within the storyworld.
3 Enter the summary: Discriminations,
contrasting types, and the power of the schema
A possible objection to the point made and illustrated above would be to say
that one of the privileges of criticism is precisely its licence to synthesize in a
plausible reading a number of issues that, viewed in close-up, might be hard to
reconcile – after all, there is nothing ontologically incompatible between the
standard interpretation of “The author of Beltraffio” and what Winner and
Kraver respectively attribute to Gwendolen and Beatrice in their comments.
5 Of course, I am referring here to the experiencing self, that is, the character who spends a
weekend with the Ambients while sad events unfold. Being a retrospective, heavily dissonant
narrative, however, oblique references to the tragic denouement occur from the very beginning.
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Critical papers, however, tend to feature a recurrent section that makes a perfect
testing ground to study the survival of the subjectivity balance of a tale as
channelled by the metarepresentational skill, its decoupling potential, and the
traceability of sources. This section is the summary often appended to critical
discussions in order to familiarize readers with the basic aspects of the work
under analysis. Two reasons, in my view, account for its aptness – first, its
presumed factuality, which critics tend to respect by trying to keep it clear of
“interpretation”6; second, its conventional brevity, which forces summarizers to
choose, and choices can be highly revealing.
Put simply, a summary expresses the distillation of the global meaning of a
text in terms of informational relevance, that is, what classical text linguistics
called a macrostructure.7 Constructed by readers in the course of text compre-
hension, these large-scale semantic units underlie closely related cognitive
processes like memorization, recalling, and summarization. In fact, to recall a
text after some delay yields a result quite akin to a summary, since most verbal
detail fades out of memory with time and the recaller must express the global
meaning in his or her own words, so to speak, without relying on the original
phrasing. Assembling a text macrostructure as the basis for recalling or sum-
marization obviously involves drastic processes of ranking and reduction of
information under the guidance of the schema, i.e. the structure of socio-cultural
preconceptions, expectations, and generic knowledge that suggest which text
components must indispensably remain and which are relatively unimportant
and can go without major distortion of the text’s core meaning.
A partial typology of summaries based on criteria relevant to my discussion
here might include, for instance, abstractive summaries versus extractive or
semiextractive summaries (Belkebin and Guessoum 2016: 44), or interpretative
and evaluative summaries versus objective and neutral summaries (Ceylan and
Mihalcea 2009: 586; Hovy and Lin 1999: 198). An abstractive summary is the
verbal expression of a macrostructure which does not incorporate literal frag-
ments of the original text, whereas an extractive or semiextractive summary is
formed, in varying proportion, by significant chunks thereof. For its part, the
6 Though the result is not exactly a summary, it is moving to see Dorothea Krook labour to
disentangle thirteen incontrovertible facts from James’s “The figure in the carpet” (1897) as the
basis for reliable interpretation (1988: 303–306).
7 Work by Teun A. van Dijk and Walter Kintsch, individually or in tandem, was vital in the
emergence of the macrostructural notion and how it became gradually integrated in a wider
cognitive design; see Kintsch and van Dijk (1978), van Dijk and Kintsch (1978), van Dijk (1980),
van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) and Kintsch (1998). Recent work on machine summarization also
invokes the macrostructure as a pivotal idea; see, for instance, Chang et al. (2002) and Zhang
et al. (2016).
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distinction between the interpretative and evaluative summaries, on the one
hand, and the objective and neutral ones, on the other, can only be sustained on
the most superficial of levels, since summarizing a multisignificant text, even if
only extractively, often entails opting for one possible version of its global
meaning which, in itself, already counts as an interpretation. Apart from these
general categories that provide suitable tools for contrast and analysis, other
types of summaries have specifically emerged from an examination of how
Jamesian critics face the necessity for furnishing details about a particular
tale. We have, for instance, what could be called truncated summaries versus
complete summaries, that is, summaries that only express one part of the global
meaning of a story (e.g. Segal 1969: 93; Wiesenfarth 2001: 237; Savoy 2010: 64)
versus those that verbalize it in full; and, more interestingly, appropriated
summaries versus original summaries, or, in other words, summaries repro-
duced verbatim from other critical works or introductory guides (Ron 1986: 46;
Martin and Ober 1992: 81) versus those – the vast majority – which have been
prepared by the end users themselves.
To define the archetypal summary of a Jamesian tale is a moot point, and
even so some discriminations are worth making. I will essentially focus on
summaries that attempt to be factual plot retellings for the enlightenment of
readers, form part of critical papers though not of the core critical discussion
itself, and are mostly free from overt interpretative matter. This simple set of
conditions disqualifies, for instance, the self-contained summaries of readers’
guides and critical companions (e.g. Gale 1965; Haralson and Johnson 2009), but
also, for the contrary reason, those plot retellings interspersed with critical
comments – the actual bulk of narrative criticism – in which facts are adduced
in support of a thesis rather than as preparatory information. Needless to say, no
clear-cut boundaries exist, and one type of summary seamlessly merges into the
next making my own choices seem at times debatable. Summaries tend to occur
when the critical object is a lesser-known tale (for instance, in a paper on “Daisy
Miller” [1878] and “Julia Bride” [1908], Buitenhuis [1959] summarizes the latter
but not the former), and also in more traditional criticism where their role as
critical aids is not excessively mistrusted. Exceptions and counterexamples
abound, though.
The illustrative analogy drawn above between unreliable narrators and
unreliable critics based on the common neglect of metarepresentational sources
can be extended one degree further to the more specialized role of summarizers.
Just like critics at large, but with more limited grounds to justify leaps of faith
given their conventional commitment to accurate reporting, summarizers often
drop source-tags and ignore how intelligence circulates; thus, they betray the
informational complexity of a text and read against it in such a way that the
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expected function of summaries in these circumstances – i.e. to serve as basic
orientation for readers – tends to remain unfulfilled. Key concerns are, of course,
(a) if the global meaning of a narrative text can be established and verbally
reproduced regardless of the text’s informational make-up; (b) if such global
meaning alters significantly if proposition p is directly attributed to one char-
acter or else refracted through several mental embedments; and, vitally for this
paper, (c) if these issues can be made short work of in a fiction writer like James
who often creates information-conscious narrators morbidly bent on document-
ing the meandering course of tiny bits of intelligence.8
Consider these two abstracts, each instancing one of the two contrasting
attitudes that can be adopted as to the treatment of metarepresentational
sources in summaries:
“The author of Beltraffio,” produced in 1884, is a story about a writer, Paul [sic] Ambient,
whose wife, Beatrice, finds his works “objectionable” and fears that they will have a
detrimental effect on their son, Dolcino. While the narrator, a rather gushing admirer of
Ambient’s, is visiting the couple, Dolcino becomes ill. In an attempt to reconcile Beatrice to
her husband, the narrator suggests that she read her husband’s latest novel; Beatrice
complies and reads it over her child’s sickbed. Repelled by the text, she attempts to save her
son from corruption by refusing to give him his prescribed medication. When Dolcino’s
condition worsens, Beatrice repents and tries to save him, but it is too late, and he dies as
a result of her action. (Walton 1992: 67; my italics except in “Beltraffio”)
On the surface, “The author of Beltraffio” presents a look at the private life of Mark
Ambient, a famous writer. Ambient’s relationship with his wife and child (and his visiting
sister), as viewed through the eyes of an infatuated narrator critic/visitor, is anything but
what the narrator had expected – far from idyllic … The narrator’s hyperbolic description of
Ambient’s novel … invites us to question the narrator’s ability to present events objectively …
During his visit with the writer, the narrator is … witness to a constant battle between
husband and wife in terms of dealing with the sickly Dolcino. The battle over the child
takes on such a force that eventually the child dies because the mother, for reasons only
surmised by Ambient’s sister and the narrator, has refused treatment of her son’s sickness.
The mother, under the influence of her husband’s most recent work … evidently becomes
crazed and (according to Ambient’s sister) sacrifices her son to death rather than risk his
eventual exposure to his father’s work. (Gardaphe 1989: 122–23; my italics except in
“Beltraffio”)
8 “I had never sought the acquaintance of his father’s people,” says Lady Emma in “Maud-
Evelyn” (1900), “nor seen either his aunt or his cousin, so that the account given by these
relatives of the circumstances of their separation [of Marmaduke and the said relatives] reached
me at last only through the girl [Lavinia], to whom, also – for she knew them as little – it had
circuitously come” (James 1996–1999: 5.183). This is just an instance of how painstakingly
James follows the path of a piece of information to avoid the facile short cuts of ominiscience.
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With minor exceptions to be noted later, the Walton abstract denotes a set of
circumstances raised to the status of fictional facts within the storyworld by
consistently thwarting the reader’s capacity to discriminate between genuine
source-free representations and metarepresentations elliptically reported – in
other words, between established truths and unacknowledged mental states and
inferences. Even if one concedes that some representations are legitimate facts
against which no cognitive protection is needed (e.g. Ambient exists and is a
writer; the narrator admires Ambient; Dolcino becomes ill; Beatrice reads
Ambient’s latest novel; Dolcino dies), there is a number of unverified opinions
that pass for factual reporting simply because their sources and paths of propa-
gation are not disclosed, and so cannot be distinguished from, say, the existence
of Mark Ambient himself. Take, for one, Beatrice’s fears about the corruption
of Dolcino by his father’s works. In the ultimate analysis, this is just a plausible
belief instilled in the narrator’s mind by Ambient’s sister – “[Beatrice] has a
dread of my brother’s influence on the child – on the formation of his character,
of his principles. It is as if it were a subtle poison, or a contagion …” (James
1996–1999: 2.887). Given the conspicuous rivalry between the women, to express
Beatrice’s fears as an unconditional, sourceless fact may even entail some
ethical responsibility on the summarizer’s part. But it is in the domain of
causality where the effect of elliptical metarepresentations can be best seen.
Though truly constitutive of the kind of storyworld constructed in this summary,
the causal link between Beatrice’s genuine revulsion for her husband’s works –
she admits as much in direct speech when she calls them “objectionable” (James
1996–1999: 2.886) – and the attempt to save her son by withdrawing his
medication, which amounts to murdering him, is hardly established as a fic-
tional certainty in the tale. Once again, it is rather Gwendolen’s notion that “[h]is
mother has let him die!” (James 1996–1999: 2.908) as refracted in the narrator’s
mind, along with some details reportedly furnished by the night nurse – “I know
this from the nurse” (James 1996–1999: 2.909), she claims – who may have
observed Beatrice’s attitude to her son’s worsening symptoms. Even her last-
minute repentance, also asserted as a fact, is just a conceivable reaction in a
mother, but, from an informational perspective, it should only count as the
conjectural attribution of a mental state.
The Gardaphe abstract, for its part, deals quite differently with the subjec-
tivity balance of this tale. Apart from encoding a set of absolute fictional facts, it
also provides the means – i.e. the source-tags – to distinguish them from those
pieces of information which are (only) true in the subjective realms of charac-
ters. Two features set it off from the Walton abstract – first, the insistence on the
explicit role of the narrator as a prime conditioning factor of the acquisition and
circulation of knowledge thoughout the tale; second, the foregrounding of
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Gwendolen’s subjectivity as the origin of the causal links that are essential to the
tale. The narrator’s angle of vision is emphasized by the summarizer and his
reliability openly discussed in relation to his overriding allegiance to Ambient’s
work. Walton herself hints at the narrator’s infatuation with the writer by calling
the former “a rather gushing admirer,” but her commitment to what she deems
factual summarizing prevents her, I think, from linking such veneration to his
actual capacity for truthful reporting. Gwendolen’s role too is twice underlined
by Gardaphe – quite transparently when the connection between Dolcino’s
death and his mother’s fear of “his eventual exposure to his father’s work” is
made directly contingent on his aunt’s subjectivity by declaring that this is so
“according to Ambient’s sister”; and in a more roundabout way in the last
sentence of the middle paragraph, which contains two metarepresentations,
one elliptical and another explicit. While “the child dies because the mother …
has refused treatment of her son’s sickness” is just a hypothesis spuriously
granted the status of a source-free fact, the reason behind such ruthless beha-
viour – that is, Beatrice’s insane drive to pre-empt Dolcino’s corruption – is
given as a surmise by “Ambient’s sister and the narrator.” Total fidelity to the
tale, however, would call for the description of this phenomenon as two nested
metarepresentations (i.e. “The narrator thinks that Gwendolen thinks that
Beatrice, etc.”) rather than as only one with a joint source (i.e. “Gwendolen
and the narrator think that Beatrice, etc.”). In my view, and despite the notable
reduction in size typical of these summaries, Gardaphe surely felt that the
subjectivity make-up of this story, as conveyed by the sources of information
and the distribution of intelligence, was integral with its overall meaning, and
should not be relegated or altogether ignored.
The respective occurrence of the terms “‘objectionable’” and “evidently” in
the Walton and Gardaphe abstracts draws attention to the fact that the proposi-
tional statement of sources (“The elderly tenant believed”) is just one way to make
visible the workings of subjectivity in a narrative text. In order to mark a mental
state or inference as such, and correctly decouple it from unconditional certain-
ties, several resources can be mobilized by summarizers. Apart from declaring
sources propositionally, there is an array of distancing expressions, of unequal
indicative potential, that qualify the fictional factuality of information. To say
“Alan will get promoted” is, at least outwardly, a representation; to say “Nina
presumes Alan will get promoted” is a standard metarepresentation; but to say
“Presumably Alan will get promoted” is also a kind of metarepresentation, with an
unidentified source, which retains part of its decoupling capacity and can hardly
be mistaken for a fictional fact. Similar terms like “apparently,” “seemingly,”
“supposedly,” “evidently,” “doubtfully,” “allegedly,” “it is claimed,” etc. also
imply modalizing judgements and thus the insertion of subjectivity in the
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reporting, even if the concrete metarepresentational source for a given content
remains unnamed. Another distancing device often used by summarizers (e.g.
Otten 2006: 69; Randall 2015: 2–3; Toor 1970: 34; Wiesenfarth 2001: 238) is to
deploy extractive techniques in their abstracts, which, as explained above, consist
of taking literal fragments of varying length from the original story as one way to
disclaim responsibility for the ontological status of a piece of information within
the storyworld. Instead of making an express choice, the summarizer steps aside,
invokes the author’s text, and ostensibly passes the burden to the reader. When
Walton quotes Beatrice’s literal term “objectionable” in reference to her husband’s
work, the critic is – albeit only slightly – going against the grain of her own modus
operandi in the rest of her summary by underlining the provenance and thus the
subjective nature of a crucial opinion.
The foregoing discussion of these two abstracts, but especially of the Walton
one as the marked term of the comparison, makes one wonder why perfectly
tagged datasets are indiscriminately thrown together as if a three-dimensional
cognitive map of mental interaction collapsed into a flat landscape. Apart from
neutralizing a key component of James’s mature narrative practice, unilateral
summaries of the Walton kind are nutshell interpretations which condition the
critical approach to the text and stabilize, from the outset, what should perhaps
remain unstable. Along this line, “The author of Beltraffio” is reduced in sum-
mary to the story of a bigoted, pitiless mother who causes her child’s death in
order to shield him from the immorality of his father’s works, and even if other
takes on this narrative were also considered, the expected circumspection and
authority of summaries would heavily constrain the response of readers. Two
reasons mentioned earlier account for this minor betrayal of the original text.
One concerns the default trustworthiness of narrators, and the other the readerly
drive to save cognitive resources by ignoring source-tags when (mis)judged
redundant. The operation of both, however, is best understood in the light of
the schema.
Discourse comprehension, i.e. the extraction and mental representation of
global meaning, is not only inductively based on “the new information provided
by the text,” but deductively contingent on “knowledge already available”
(Kintsch et al. 1977: 547). Since a summary is the verbal expression, on a reduced
scale, of such global meaning, it follows that summarization will be heavily
influenced by knowledge already stored in memory, whose structured represen-
tation we call schema. So a summary is more than a small-size facsimile of an
original text, and summarization a constructive rather than a merely scaling
process. For this reason, when Walton equates the ontological status of Mark
Ambient, the writer, with that of his wife’s fears for Dolcino’s moral corruption
by reporting both as facts despite their substantive differences, one can argue
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that she has been carried away by the schema, ceased to respond to the
cognitive rhetoric actually deployed by James, and begun summarizing accord-
ing to preconceptions rather than the materiality of the text. But what are these
preconceptions that Walton readily accepts and Gardaphe resists?
Apart from more diffuse issues of critical background and overall cultural
expectations, the cluster of assumptions that generates summaries of the
Walton variety turns precisely on the bonus of credibility accorded by default
to the teller of any tale. Until proved wrong, what narrators say has ontological
precedence, even if they simply express a notion that did not originate with
them and can be neatly traced back along an informational chain whose
middle links may contribute unknown amounts of fallibility. All happens as
if only the final stage mattered, and readers, critics, or summarizers turned a
blind eye on unambiguous recognitions of deferral. “Mark Ambient went on,”
says the narrator, “while my thoughts reverted to his ladylike wife, as inter-
preted by his remarkable sister” (James 1996–1999: 2.890). This is not an
unreliable narrator, for he is fully aware that what he reports is his subjective
vision of Beatrice as mediated by Gwendolen’s own subjective vision; rather it
is an unreliable summarizer, who grants the narrator an authority he clearly
disclaims, since the latter can keep track of sources while the former cannot.
The power of the schema overrides the text and the result is a curious mis-
reading, or rather underreading, of cognitive clues that are arguably there to be
read.
4 The treatment of subjectivity in the
summarizing of James’s tales
The contrasting pattern set up by the two prototypical summaries previously
discussed recurs, with compelling variations and nuances, in many other sum-
maries of James’s tales by critics. In Section 1 of this paper, I suggested that
these summaries display a veritable oscillation between two poles – from keep-
ing track of sources and paths of propagation of intelligence at all reasonable
costs to a disregard of them in favour of reporting simply source-bound content
as if it were source-free. This oscillation can take place between opposing kinds
of summaries, or, most interestingly, within summaries themselves, that is,
between pieces of information which, consistently metarepresented in the origi-
nal text, can be summarized either as metarepresentations or as spurious repre-
sentations for a variety of reasons. Both types of oscillations can be interrelated
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by placing them on a continuum whose ends are respectively occupied by
summaries of the Walton and Gardaphe kinds, and whose middle positions
are held by “mixed” summaries which report originally source-tagged material
as fictional fact, or else as explicit metarepresentations. Interesting patterns can
be seen to derive from this alternation.
Summaries that conform to the schema, i.e. that assume the narrator’s
version while ignoring its provenance or ontological status, occur more often
than those which oppose it. “Maud-Evelyn” (1900), for instance, one of James’s
most complex tales in terms of source-embedding and the circulation of intelli-
gence, is rendered by Wichelns as a brief succession of fictional facts.
Marmaduke’s materialistic motives, as suggested by the summary, are originally
little more than a hesitant suspicion on the narrator’s part which manifests itself
in the form of unvoiced questions such as “Was he [Marmaduke] altogether silly
or was he only altogether mercenary?,” and “Are you [Marmaduke] the boldest
and basest of fortune-hunters, or have you only … suffered your brain slightly to
soften?” (James 1996–1999: 5.190, 5.198). What is more, Marmaduke’s aristo-
cratic background and the Dedricks’ consequent aspiration to “the social legiti-
macy of a noble heir” (Wichelns 2011: 75) do not even feature in the tale and
should be read as the summarizer’s own critical inference.
Following the same pattern of surrender to the narrator’s version, we have two
interesting summaries of James’s “The Death of the Lion” (1894) by Chapman and
Hext, respectively. For most of the tale, the narrator maintains that Neil Paraday –
the alleged great writer on whom the plot hinges – is dragged out from obscurity,
exploited, and lionized against his will, even if much of what happens can be
actually construed as contradicting the narrator’s view, since Paraday submits with
arguable gusto to his new station in life and his eventual death cannot be linked in
good faith to the absurd lionization bestowed on him (Machida 13, 16). Paraday, in
fact, rather seems the victim of the narrator’s jealousy and possessiveness, of his
efforts to prevent his contact with other people, especially with young female
admirers like Miss Hurter. Evidence that both Chapman and Hext ostensibly
interpret as they summarize and see facts where only opinions are intended
comes in the use of loaded terms – e.g. “prey,” “protect,” “social predators”
(Chapman 1990: 63, 64), and, a sensu contrario, “quietly” in “Paraday … lives
quietly” (Hext 2017: 40) – that bespeak the narrator’s own likes and dislikes. Both
summarizers have a problem, however, in Paraday’s unresisting submission to
lionization, and both curiously solve it likewise. Instead of detaching themselves
from the narrator’s suspect view of things via source-tagging or distancing terms,
they make up reasons to justify Paraday’s ready acceptance of his new role as a
social celebrity. So for Chapman “he reveals a weakness before the demands of
others, especially strong-willed women” (1990: 64); whereas for Hext it is
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his “good humor and politeness [which] make him an easy target for suburban
society” (2017: 40) – anything except resisting the power of the schema
and admitting that Paraday might actually like some late-life exposure to the
limelight.
This prevailing pattern is essentially reversed in the summaries of “Maud-
Evelyn” and “Brooksmith” (1891), authored by Santangelo and Flannery respec-
tively, as well as variously challenged in the abstracts of other stories like “Sir
Edmund Orme” (1891), “The Coxon fund” (1894), and “The real thing” (1892).
Even with occasional lapses to be noted below, Santangelo does justice in his
abstract to the cognitive rhetoric originally deployed by James and refrains from
reporting heavily source-tagged content as fictional fact, possibly because the
topic of his essay – “the construction of a reality by the developing sensibilities
of the three major characters” (1975: 45) – sensitizes him to these issues.
Practically all major units of information attributed to sources in the tale retain
such attributions in the summary. Marmaduke, for instance, is not an adven-
turer, but it is rather “Lady Emma,” the intradiegetic narrator, who “thinks him”
one (1975: 45). Consistent with this attempt at informational accuracy, there is
an abundance of attributing devices pointing to sources and indicating how
intelligence propagates. We have that “the older woman [Lady Emma] learns
from Marmaduke” about the existence of Maud-Evelyn (1975: 45); that “Lavinia
later informs her” that Maud-Evelyn died long ago (1975: 45); that “[o]n Lady
Emma’s enquiring … Lavinia answers” (1975: 45); that “Lavinia is his confidant,
recounting with additions the affairs to Lady Emma who also gets some details
from Marmaduke” (1975: 46), and so on. Three pieces of information, however,
evade the general tendency and get processed as (false) representations – that
the Dedricks “take him [Marmaduke] up and pay his expenses” (1975: 45); that
“the Dedricks have actually selected the young man [Marmaduke] as fiancé and
later husband for their dead daughter” (1975: 45); and the causal link between
the Dedricks’ sense of accomplishment at having married Maud-Evelyn to
Marmaduke and their death (1975: 46). Despite their outward format, these
circumstances are not established facts; they rather derive from a network of
inferences made by characters, passed on in conversation between them, and
summarized in due course with little regard to their origin and mode of
circulation.
Flannery’s abstract of “Brooksmith,” though shorter than Santangelo’s, also
displays a significant number of source-specifying devices. Brooksmith, the
butler of an elderly unmarried diplomat, “is represented by the narrator”
(2007: 91) as the discreet artificer of the urbane, highly civilized conversation
characteristic of his employer’s salon. When the latter dies, Brooksmith finds it
difficult to gain another butlership, because “it is assumed,” presumably by
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prospective employers, that he has been “‘spoilt’” (2007: 92), a key word
extractively carried over from the original text to suggest that his highbrow
role at the diplomat’s establishment has disqualified him for normal duty as a
butler. Three years later, the narrator “learns from his [Brooksmith’s] aunt” that
he has disappeared, and both narrator and aunt “assume” that he has com-
mitted suicide (2007: 92). Thus all major pieces of information reflected in the
summary are made contingent on minds embedded in the storyworld – espe-
cially the uncertain intimation of suicide – and even the term “spoilt” contri-
butes to generating some distance between the summarizer’s stance and the
reported content.
Other abstracts, however, show a remarkable fluctuation between source-
free and source-bound informational units which can be tentatively connected
with the narrator’s attitude to key elements of the fictional world and the
summarizer’s assumption or rejection of such an attitude. “‘The Coxon fund’
is about Saltram,” says Chapman in her summary, “a perceived genius who is a
socially unacceptable man, a lazy reprobate who is nevertheless considered to
be a brilliant talker by several ordinary and conventional people” (1990: 70; my
italics). It is quite obvious that Saltram’s assets – “genius,” “brilliant talker” –
are metarepresented, that is, made dependent on the subjectivity of sources,
whether openly specified or not, whereas his liabilities – “a socially unaccep-
table man,” “a lazy reprobate” – are given as fictional facts. This distribution
agrees fairly well with the narrator’s assessment of Saltram for long stretches
of the narrative and possibly with Chapman’s own deep-seated critical con-
ception of the central character of this tale. A similar oscillation, if more subtle,
takes place in “Sir Edmund Orme.” “Following Major Marden’s death years
later,” summarizes Brown, “Sir Edmund’s ghost had begun to appear to Mrs
Marden, determined apparently to prevent Charlotte [her daughter] from
wronging another man as her mother had wronged him” (1998: 63; my italics).
Unlike “The way it came” (1896) or “The turn of the screw” (1898), whose
apparitions remain ontologically contentious because a pair of characters in
each narrative fail to agree on their factuality, “Sir Edmund Orme” is a plain
ghost story and both the narrator and Mrs Marden share the same experience,
which is accordingly reported as the representation of a fact. However, the
relation between Sir Edmund’s apparition and his beyond-the-grave wish to
prevent another wrong is not consensual, but rather Mrs Marden’s hypothesis.
It is thus metarepresented with a source-tag pointing to her, which, in the
summary, leaves a definite trace – “apparently” – in the form of a distancing
expression. In this case, Brown’s abstract faithfully replicates the subjectivity
make-up of the original story. Finally, two summaries of “The real thing,”
respectively by Lainoff and Toor, show a parallel response to the main concern
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of this tale, namely the strange inadequacy of aristocrats, such as Captain
Monarch and his wife, to pose for illustrations of aristocratic people and what
it tells us about the aesthetic and ethical intricacies of artistic representation.
Each summary renders the gist of the situation respectively as “They
[the Monarchs] proclaim themselves to be the real thing … but they prove
rigid, with little suggestiveness and little ability to draw out the artist’s imagi-
native powers” (Lainoff 1956: 192; my italics in “proclaim”) and “The Monarchs
proffer themselves as suitable models … They don’t work out …” (Toor 1970: 34;
my italics). Two epistemic positions within the storyworld hold contrary views
on the suitability of the Monarchs as models – the Monarchs themselves and
the narrator, who moves in the story from a mental state of doubt to one of
certitude as to their incapacity for the task. Both Lainoff and Toor, however,
suscribe to the same strategy in their summaries. They represent as sourceless
facts those elements of content that accord with the narrator’s belief – which
they assume – and as source-tagged, contingent information those at odds
with such belief.
Compelling as the above cases may be, the most puzzling issue connected
with the handling of fictional subjectivity in transit between tale and summary
is, to my mind, the interpretive discrepancies that occasionally develop between
what critics uphold in their essays and what is implied by the treatment of
metarepresentational sources in the corresponding summaries. Unsurprisingly,
agreement predominates. Critics either follow the prevailing schema and accept
the narrator’s version both in summaries and in the rest of their papers, or they
resist it in both places.
In his discussion of “The way it came,” Ross, for instance, takes an appari-
tionist stance and sides with the unnamed woman narrator in assuming that her
fiancé was actually visited by another woman after the latter’s death. The super-
natural element is denied by the man, who argues that the visit took place before
her death. Much as in the case of “The real thing,” the summary encodes such
divergence in the following terms, “she appears in apparitional form to the man,
who believes that he sees the friend, not her ghost” (2010: 110; my italics), that is,
Ross opts for an interpretation in his paper and summarizes as fact what accords
with it and as a mental state what does not. Cases of agreement between overall
reading and summary in which neither assumes the narrator’s views are Tintner’s
summaries of “The way it came” and “Louisa Pallant.” In stark contrast to Ross,
Tintner argues that the ghost in the first of these two tales is epistemic rather than
ontological, or, in other words, that its existence is contingent on the woman
narrator’s frame of mind, a critical conviction that fits well with the treatment of
sources in the abstract. Apart from being fairly extractive, with a number of literal
quotations that contribute distancing potential, this abstract underlines the
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summarizer’s refusal to report the deceased woman’s visit to the fiancé as an
unconditional fact by attributing this content to the woman narrator’s subjectivity.
Thus we have that “the narrator insists that it was a ghost he saw,” that “she is
convinced that … [they] have met after the woman’s death,” that “she knows that
their love can go on,” that “[s]he insists that the spirit comes ‘every night,’” and,
finally, that “[w]hen the man dies six years later, according to the narrator, it is ‘a
response to an irresistible call’ from the dead woman” (1991: 358; my italics except
in “after”). In “Louisa Pallant,” Tintner similarly argues against the narrator’s
version both in the abstract and in the critical commentary. For the sake of
accuracy, however, one should point out that what she actually gainsays is
Louisa Pallant’s view of her daughter’s personality as uncritically assumed by
the narrator. The repulsive image projected by Mrs Pallant of her daughter Linda
is, for Tintner, an insidious fabrication intended to drive off the narrator’s nephew
Archie, who loves the young woman, and thus obtain a better match. The
summary dutifully reflects this by quoting key words from the tale as a distancing
device – “she [Mrs Pallant] wishes to make ‘reparation,’ even ‘expiation,’ by now
‘saving’ his nephew” (1985: 69–70) – but, above all, by clearly attributing Linda’s
shocking worldliness to her mother’s comments, for the latter “claims she has
taught [Linda] to be more worldly than herself” (1985: 70; my italics).
But it is dissent between a commentator’s overall conception of a tale and its
summary which most perplexes attentive readers. One can find cases where critics
surrender to the narrator’s ostensible view of events in abstracts, but challenge
this view in their comments. This is a kind of double submission to the general
schema that narrators enjoy a default bonus of credibility, since critics not only
summarize against the cognitive rhetoric of the original text, but also against their
own readings in other parts of their papers. In his truncated summary of “The
liar” (1888), Segal reports as source-free, fictional fact what in James’s story is just
an interpretative option (e.g. Booth 1983: 347–54) and in his own critical com-
mentary a discredited reading. The causal link between Lyon’s annoyance and his
discovery that Everina, his former beloved and the alleged sum of all perfections,
seems to love a notorious liar is given as a positive fact in the summary – “he is
shocked, disgusted, and deeply irritated when he discovers that the woman
he still greatly admires appears to be in love with … a pathological liar”
(Segal 1969: 93). Most of Segal’s work, however, is precisely devoted to discussing
Lyon’s role as a centre of consciousness and arguing that he acts out of pure
jealousy while attempting to make his motives acceptable to himself by disguising
them as an aversion to his rival’s ethical shortcoming. In Nicoloff’s summary of
“Louisa Pallant,” we have a curious sample of what one might call a deliberate
discrepancy between abstract and critical commentary. At first sight, the abstract
is a string of hard fictional facts without the least hint that the tale is constructed
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as a vast, recursive metarepresentation whereby the narrative agent represents
Mrs Pallant’s mind representing his daughter’s personality with the refracting
potential that this double change of medium entails. In this summary, Linda
Pallant is “a thoroughly heartless daughter” and has a “corrupt nature”
(Nicoloff 1970: 409); moreover, the causal link between Mrs Pallant’s atonement
for her own past worldliness and the betrayal of her daughter to protect her suitor
from future suffering is not qualified by distancing expressions, but rather
asserted as an absolute certainty. Right after the summary, however, Nicoloff
explicitly disowns his factual version of the tale by arguing that “with closer
observation … [a] dozen points of apparent fact slowly metamorphose into mere
opinion” (1970: 409), and he continues his critical analysis along similar lines to
those followed by Tintner in the paper I mentioned above.9
But dissent between critique and summary can also keep to the contrary
pattern, namely to trust the narrator’s capacity to give a sound version of the
storyworld in the former and undermine this version in the latter by source-
tagging content in subtle ways. Both instances here are summaries of “The turn
of the screw.” O’Gorman aligns himself in his critical work with apparitionists and
maintains that the ghosts of Quint and Miss Jessel are not projections of the
governess’s mind, but rather belong to the baseline ontology of the fictional
world; this was James’s intention, he argues, and authorial design should not
be banished from criticism (1980: 126). So one would expect O’Gorman to refer to
their existence in his summary as a spotless set of source-free representations, but
he appears to hesitate. Cautiously, he tends to link them to the governess’s
subjective realm through distancing expressions and conjectural pointers such
as “insofar as we know,” two occurrences of “perhaps,” and, above all, by making
them contingent on “dread suspicions” and on “having proved to her satisfaction”
that such suspicions were true (1980: 126; my italics). Finally, even if Ross
attempts to keep a neutral position in his discussion of “The turn of the screw”
as to the mode of insertion of the supernatural in the storyworld, his summary
seems to betray a more committed view of this novella. The governess “reports
that she unexpectedly perceives the ghosts,” “believes the pair to be evil,” and
even “[s]uppos[es] that the children are in clandestine communication with the
specters” she claims to see (Ross 2010: 125). Once again the summary takes an
alternative course to the main thrust of the critical paper that contains it.
9 Bishop’s summarization of “The liar” sticks to the same strategy, but here he first discourses
for a couple of paragraphs on abstracts being ready-made interpretations especially in open
works like this tale. Then he assumes Lyon’s version of what happens and turns out an entirely
factual summary (1988: 41–42).
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5 Closing remarks
The points made above count as a description of, and as a preliminary attempt to
systematize, how the subjectivity of fictional characters and character-narrators
migrates from original narratives to summaries in a concrete body of fiction, as
this is reflected in the treatment of metarepresentational sources and other com-
plementary indices of distance and conjecture. Several degrees of (in)fidelity or
tampering have been identified and discussed in relation to concrete tales in the
Jamesian canon – from cases where the primitive structure of sources and flows of
information tends to be replicated in the summary to those in which it is basically
omitted as if it were a superfluous element whose reproduction made no sense
under the conventional physical constraints of summarizing. No real abstract,
however, totally represents or totally ignores the informational profile of the
original text, and from the resulting combinations stem a number of patterns
that have been discussed with regard to variables such as the weight accorded by
the summarizer to the narrator’s version of the storyworld and the context in
which the summary occurs, that is, whether there is interpretative agreement or
disagreement, as subtly evinced by the handling of sources, between what critics
say in their commentaries and in their abstracts.
The treatment of subjectivity in summaries via metarepresentation has also
a major impact on their authentication potential or capacity to turn possible
worlds into “real” fictional worlds of the kind described, for instance, by Doležel
in Heterocosmica (1998: Ch. 6). In this respect, four combinations are conceiva-
ble and merit further research – source-free fictional facts summarized as
source-free fictional facts; source-free fictional facts summarized as source-
bound states of mind, a theoretical possibility for which I have found no clear
illustration; source-bound states of mind summarized as source-bound states of
mind; and the most enticing and destabilizing option, source-bound states of
mind summarized as source-free fictional facts, i.e. as spurious representations,
or as metarepresentations whose signs of mental embeddedness have been
omitted. When the latter obtain, the authentication function is seriously com-
promised, and this may condition how readers interact with the summary and
possibly with the critical text as a whole; worst of all, by processing as uncondi-
tional fact what is belief, fear, or fantasy in the original tale, one interprets it and
endows it with a sense of finality and closure that is incompatible with most of
the works mentioned in this paper. Narrators may occasionally lose track of
themselves or of others as the genuine sources of their metarepresentations, and
thus become unreliable, but we, readers, critics, and summarizers, can hardly
afford such looseness.
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